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PEDIGREE PROSECUTION:  SHOULD A HEAD OF 
STATE’S FAMILY MEMBERS BE ENTITLED TO 
IMMUNITY IN FOREIGN COURTS? 
Yena Hong* 
 
States tread carefully in international affairs to maintain mutual respect 
for sovereignty.  In today’s legal order, a head of state is the sovereign state 
personified.  Until the twentieth century, heads of state did not routinely 
travel outside of their respective domains.  Consequently, mutual respect for 
foreign sovereigns was usually implemented in national courts by 
recognition of immunity for diplomats and public vessels—paradigmatically, 
warships.  Today, heads of state often travel to other countries, and it is 
increasingly accepted as customary international law that a head of state 
cannot be sued or prosecuted in a foreign court on the basis of any of his or 
her acts, public or private.  To permit such prosecution or litigation would 
invite reciprocal retaliation and ultimately risk a breakdown of relations 
between the countries involved. 
But should a head of state’s family members also have absolute immunity 
in foreign countries, particularly for private acts with no plausible 
connection to official functions?  Despite progress in crystallizing the scope 
of customary international law of head-of-state immunity, there is scant 
discussion regarding the international law basis of immunity for members of 
a head of state’s family.  Some states have invoked the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) to grant head-of-state family members 
“diplomatic immunity” from local prosecution or litigation.  Such action 
seems plausible when, for instance, first ladies or other family members are 
accompanying heads of state on official visits or are themselves performing 
an official act in visiting a foreign nation.  Yet, there are many instances 
involving a head of state’s family members in foreign countries that have 
nothing to do with official business—such as sightseeing, shopping, or 
studying.  In many notable cases involving similar personal business, host 
nations have accorded a head of state’s family members immunity for the 
sake of diplomacy, though they often invoke a legal basis like the VCDR. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2013, University of 
Pennsylvania.  I would like to thank Professor Thomas H. Lee for his time, guidance, and 
wisdom throughout the process of writing this Note.  I also wish to thank Immanuel E. Kim 
and my friends for their continuing encouragement, and my mother for her unconditional love 
and support in all that I do. 
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This Note distinguishes between two types of immunity for a head of state’s 
family members:  absolute immunity ratione personae and qualified immunity 
ratione materiae.  On the one hand, absolute immunity ratione personae 
covers both private and official acts that a state official commits during his 
or her term in office.  Qualified immunity ratione materiae, on the other hand, 
covers only those acts that are official and not private.  This Note proposes 
that the international community should limit foreign immunity for a head of 
state’s family members to qualified immunity ratione materiae.  There will 
often be compelling reasons to allow a head of state’s family member to exit 
and escape prosecution or litigation for private acts.  There is, however, no 
legal basis for immunity in such cases, and suggesting that there is only 
serves to dilute head-of-state immunity more generally and wreak havoc in 
the development of relevant international law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On Saturday, August 12, 2017, Gabriella Engels, a South African model, 
went to the Taboo nightclub in Sandton, Gauteng, South Africa, with her two 
girlfriends.1  While at the nightclub, another of Engels’s friends introduced 
the women to Chatunga Bellarmine Mugabe and his brother Robert Mugabe 
Jr.,2 who are the sons of Zimbabwe’s former President Robert Mugabe and 
 
 1. Khanyi Ndabeni, First Lady Grace Mugabe ‘Was Ready to Murder,’ SUNDAY TIMES 
(Aug. 20, 2017, 12:02 AM), https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-08-19-
first-lady-grace-mugabe-was-ready-to-murder/ [https://perma.cc/YT7L-PL8N] (“Engels and 
her two friends were celebrating a 21st birthday.”). 
 2. Id. 
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first lady Grace Mugabe.3  Engels and her two girlfriends left the nightclub 
after getting into an argument with some acquaintances of the Mugabe 
brothers.4 
According to news reports, the next day, Engels’s friend apologized for the 
previous night’s argument and invited the three women to come by the 
Capital 20 West, a hotel in Sandton.5  This was the same hotel at which the 
Mugabe brothers were staying,6 but the three women had no interaction with 
them that day.7  Fifteen minutes after Engels and her two girlfriends arrived 
at a room in the hotel, Grace Mugabe stormed into the room to look for her 
two sons.8  Instead, Grace Mugabe found Engels and confronted her about 
the whereabouts of her sons.9  When Engels could not give her an answer, 
Grace Mugabe proceeded to whip Engels with an extension cord.10  The 
attack lasted approximately twenty minutes,11 during which Grace Mugabe’s 
ten bodyguards stood by and watched.12  Engels needed fourteen stitches to 
close up the gashes on her face and her scalp caused by Grace Mugabe’s 
assault.13 
 
 3. Id.  Zimbabwe’s former President Robert Mugabe resigned on Tuesday, November 
21, 2017, ending his “37 years of autocratic rule, finally succumbing to the pressure of a 
military takeover and the humiliation of impeachment.” David McKenzie et al., Robert 
Mugabe Resigns After 37 Years as Zimbabwe’s Leader, CNN (Nov. 21, 2017, 6:16 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/21/africa/robert-mugabe-resigns-zimbabwe-
president/index.html [https://perma.cc/9UA7-LLZM]. 
 4. Ndabeni, supra note 1. 
 5. Id.  It is unclear who this “friend” was who apologized to Engels and her two 
girlfriends.  The three women had also left behind a jacket when they left the Taboo nightclub 
the previous night, and this same “friend” invited the women to the hotel to return the jacket. 
Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. (“‘We had no interaction with the Mugabe brothers at all on Sunday,’ said Engels’s 
friend.  ‘We were literally there for 15 minutes.  The only thing we managed to do was smoke 
a cigarette on the balcony.  Then our friend asked us to turn off the music.  Someone important 
was coming.’”).  See generally Jan Bornman, Exclusive:  Pictures Reveal Inside Story of Grace 
Mugabe’s Hotel Rampage, TIMES LIVE (Aug. 22, 2017, 1:55 PM), 
https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-08-22-exclusive-pictures-reveal-inside-
story-of-grace-mugabes-hotel-rampage/ [https://perma.cc/LNX7-E3HK] (explaining that the 
bodyguards of Grace Mugabe’s two sons were the ones who informed her of their disruptive 
behavior at the hotel). 
 9. Ndabeni, supra note 1. 
 10. Id. (“‘She dragged me by my hair and held me tight.  She slashed me viciously with 
the electrical cord.  She then dragged me by my hair across the floor and threw me on a couch 
where she forced me to call our mutual friend and Bellarmine’s best friend, but their phones 
were off.  She continued beating me with the cord; I was rescued by the hotel manager, who 
rushed to the room after hearing my screams for help.’”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Jeffrey Moyo, Zimbabwe’s First Lady Said to Seek Diplomatic Immunity over Assault 
Claim, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/world/africa/ 
grace-mugabe-model.html [https://perma.cc/HPS4-FJ4M]. 
 13. Jane Flanagan, ‘I Thought I Was Going to Die’:  Young Model Tells of Terror as Blood 
Streamed Down Her Face After ‘Raging Robert Mugabe’s Wife Savagely Beat Her with an 
Electric Plug,’ DAILY MAIL (Aug. 16, 2017, 2:49 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
news/article-4793626/I-thought-going-die-Model-tells-terror.html [perma.cc/8YLC-3XZQ]. 
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At the Sandton police station the following day, Engels filed “a case of 
assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm” against Grace Mugabe.14  
Grace Mugabe was expected to appear in South African court the next day, 
but she was not arrested and did not surrender herself to South African 
police.15  The South African police minister, Fikile Mbalula, placed the 
border police on “red alert” in an attempt to prevent Grace Mugabe from 
leaving the country.16  Nevertheless, she was able to flee South Africa on an 
Air Zimbabwe plane, scot-free.17 
Grace Mugabe was not a diplomatic agent on an official mission to South 
Africa, nor was she acting in an official capacity as a state official when she 
whipped Engels and left her with gashes.  Grace Mugabe was acting in her 
private function as a mother of two misbehaving adult sons.18  Yet, South 
Africa’s Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane stated that she had 
granted Grace Mugabe diplomatic immunity “in the interests of South 
Africa.”19  South Africa’s government extended Grace Mugabe the privilege 
of avoiding its criminal jurisdiction through the guise of “diplomatic 
immunity” to protect the wife of a regional ally’s leader from prosecution 
rather than “enforc[e] international and domestic criminal law.”20 
While customary international law governs the immunity of a head of state 
or state official,21 the source of immunity of members of a head of state’s 
 
 14. Nico Gous, Alleged Grace Mugabe Assault Victim Offered Blank Cheque, TIMES LIVE 
(Aug. 17, 2017, 5:09 PM), https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-08-17-
alleged-grace-mugabe-assault-victim-offered-blank-cheque/ [https://perma.cc/9RND-RJVH]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Matthew Weaver, South African Police Issue ‘Red Alert’ to Stop Grace Mugabe from 
Leaving, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2017, 10:12 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ 
aug/17/south-africa-police-red-alert-grace-mugabe-zimbabwe [https://perma.cc/ZG8C-
Y2GD]. 
 17. Associated Press, Grace Mugabe Flies Home to Zimbabwe with Diplomatic Immunity, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2017, 2:12 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/20/ 
grace-mugabe-granted-diplomatic-immunity-after-alleged-attack [https://perma.cc/RTH5-
XB3U]. 
 18. See infra Part II.B.  Grace Mugabe’s two sons are infamous for their misbehavior. See 
Frank Chikowore, Watch:  Mugabe’s Son Exposes Lavish Lifestyle in a Video, NEWS24 (Aug. 
12, 2017, 7:36 AM), http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/watch-mugabes-son-
exposes-lavish-lifestyle-in-a-video-20170812 [https://perma.cc/BU7F-GDZV] (“Chatunga 
and his brother Robert Jnr were known for partying and were recently kicked out of a luxurious 
apartment in the leafy suburb of Sandton in Johannesburg for their ‘unacceptable behavior.’”); 
Govan Whittles & Simon Allison, Zim’s Disgraceful First Family, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Aug. 
18, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://mg.co.za/article/2017-08-18-00-zims-disgraceful-first-family 
[https://perma.cc/AJ3N-8LSB] (“The brothers, who [do not] work, live in a Sandton apartment 
(they were kicked out of another one in April after being involved in a violent brawl.  That 
one reportedly cost them more than R70 000 a month).  They are regulars in Jo’burg’s most 
upmarket clubs, where they order top-end alcohol and pick up the tab for entourages of up to 
20 people. . . .  They know . . . rules [do not] apply to them.”). 
 19. See Jeffrey Moyo, Grace Mugabe Wins Diplomatic Immunity After Assault 
Accusations, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/20/world/ 
africa/grace-mugabe-assault-model.html [https://perma.cc/4EHB-N9KN]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur on Immunity of State Officials 
from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction), Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from 
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/601 (May 29, 2008). 
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family is international comity.22  “International comity,” in the relevant 
sense, is deference to foreign sovereigns beyond what is plainly required by 
law.23  This deference is an essential feature of harmonious relations among 
nations.24  However, such deference should not extend to immunity for 
family members of a head of state’s family for acts that were committed in a 
private capacity without any connection to official duties.  To say or even to 
imply that such immunity applies as a matter of law risks undermining the 
important function that head-of-state immunity plays in international affairs 
by divorcing it entirely from functional justification. 
This Note asserts that while heads of state are entitled to absolute immunity 
ratione personae,25 their family members are entitled to qualified immunity 
ratione materiae26:  immunity for official functions only.  The following 
discussion supporting this assertion proceeds in three Parts.  Part I explores 
the concepts of absolute immunity ratione personae and qualified immunity 
ratione materiae as they apply to the immunities of a head of state and a 
diplomatic agent of the state.  Part II presents case studies reflecting how 
states have both limited and granted immunity to family members of heads 
of state.  Part III proposes that immunity should not be granted to members 
of a head of state’s family for acts that do not fall within the curtilage of head-
of-state functions, and it explains that not extending such immunity will 
neither hamper head-of-state functions nor undermine the sovereignty of the 
affected state. 
I.  THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RATIONE MATERIAE 
OF A HEAD OF STATE AND A DIPLOMATIC AGENT 
Treaties govern diplomatic and consular immunities, but customary 
international law is the source for immunity of heads of state and other state 
officials from foreign jurisdiction.27  For a practice to be established as 
customary international law, the practice must be widespread and uniform 
among the states, and states must believe that the practice is mandatory as a 
matter of law—that is, opinio juris.28  Once a practice is established as 
customary international law, “it is universally binding on all states” that do 
not persistently object to the practice.29 
 
 22. See id. para. 36; see also infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Kolodkin, supra note 21, paras. 35–36. 
 24. See, e.g., Michael A. Tunks, Diplomats or Defendants?:  Defining the Future of Head-
of-State Immunity, 52 DUKE L.J. 651, 657 n.31 (2002). 
 25. See infra Part I.A.  Absolute immunity ratione personae, often known as personal 
immunity, covers both private and official acts that a state official commits during his or her 
term in office. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 79. 
 26. See infra Part I.A.  Qualified immunity ratione materiae, often known as functional 
immunity, covers only those acts that a state official performs in his or her official capacity. 
Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 80. 
 27. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 33 (“The fact that the source of immunity from foreign 
jurisdiction is customary international law is noted in rulings of national courts.”). 
 28. JOHN H. CURRIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW:  DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND THEORY 121 
(2007). 
 29. Id. at 120. 
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The doctrine of immunity, however, originated from the concept of 
sovereignty in a domestic context.30  When French philosopher Jean Bodin 
coined the term “sovereignty” in 1576, his definition embraced the idea that 
“kings were sovereign within their territories” (i.e., the highest authority), 
with only God as superior to the king.31  As sovereign nations formed and 
interacted with each other in early modern Europe, the idea developed an 
international dimension—“a sovereign became immune within his territory 
and without.”32  The rationale for sovereign immunity “was expressed in the 
maxim par in parem non habet imperium:  equals cannot exercise authority 
over each other.”33  Over time, sovereign immunity became “generally 
referred to as state immunity”34 but the underlying rationale remained the 
same.35  Thus, state immunity has served as a doctrine to protect a state’s 
sovereignty by preventing other states from subjecting its property or 
interests to lawsuits in their own domestic courts.36 
Questions of sovereign immunity in foreign courts were initially presented 
in lawsuits involving diplomats (e.g., ambassadors and consuls) and public 
property, such as ships.37  In the age of sail, heads of state did not travel 
abroad, or, at least, they did not travel to foreign jurisdictions where they 
might potentially be sued.38  A diplomatic representative had immunity under 
the theory that “diplomats acting on behalf of a sovereign state embody the 
ruler of that state.”39  It followed that the ruler him or herself was, as the 
personification of the state, necessarily immune from legal proceedings in a 
foreign court.40 
At first, immunity with respect to foreign officials was based on his or her 
personal status—absolute immunity ratione personae.41  However, as the 
international community moved to the “restrictive” view of state immunity 
 
 30. See YITIHA SIMBEYE, IMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 93 (2004). 
 31. Id. at 93 n.10. 
 32. Id. at 93; see also id. at 105–06 (explaining a king’s absolute immunity). 
 33. Id. at 93. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Brian Man-ho Chok, Let the Responsible Be Responsible:  Judicial Oversight and 
Over-Optimism in the Arrest Warrant Case and the Fall of the Head of State Immunity 
Doctrine in International and Domestic Courts, 30 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 489, 496 (2015) 
(“[T]he rationale for state immunity originates from the idea of par in parem non habet 
imperium.”). 
 36. See ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 67 (2008). 
 37. See generally The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
 38. Cf. Stephen L. Wright, Diplomatic Immunity:  A Proposal for Amending the Vienna 
Convention to Deter Violent Criminal Acts, 5 B.U. INT’L L.J. 177, 194 n.99 (1987) (explaining 
that monarchs sent diplomats as a primary means of communication between states, but a 
given monarch would be reluctant to “send its diplomats abroad without immunity because its 
absence would permit other powers to interfere with the diplomat’s conduct and thus hinder 
his ability to communicate”). 
 39. Mitchell S. Ross, Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity:  A Review of Remedial 
Approaches to Address the Abuses of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 4 AM. U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 173, 177 (1989). 
 40. See SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 94. 
 41. SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE § 12.3 (Sir Ivor Roberts ed., 6th ed. 2009). 
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doctrine,42 the basis for granting jurisdictional immunity shifted from 
absolute immunity ratione personae to qualified immunity ratione 
materiae—functional immunity that attaches only to the extent that the 
immunity-holder is performing an official function.43 
This Part explores functional immunity as it applies to the immunity of a 
head of state and a diplomatic agent.  Part I.A examines the difference 
between absolute immunity ratione personae and qualified immunity ratione 
materiae and discusses acts that are covered by the latter.  Part I.B outlines 
how qualified immunity ratione materiae applies in granting a head of state 
immunity to ensure that the official functions of the head of state are not 
impeded and that respect for state sovereignty is maintained.  Part I.C then 
explains how qualified immunity ratione materiae applies in granting 
diplomatic immunity to ensure that the official functions of the diplomatic 
agent are not impeded. 
A.  Two Types of Immunity:  Absolute Immunity Ratione Personae 
and Qualified Immunity Ratione Materiae 
There are two types of immunity for heads of states and diplomats:  
immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae.44  The oldest 
type of immunity that exists is immunity ratione personae, and it is 
absolute.45  It relates to the individual46 as it “attaches to the person in 
question by virtue of [his or her] office.”47  Immunity ratione personae is 
absolute in that it covers “acts performed by a State official in both an official 
and a private capacity, both before and while occupying his [or her] post.”48  
Such immunity is temporary in character; it only “becomes effective when 
the official takes up his [or her] post and ceases when he [or she] leaves [the] 
 
 42. See Tunks, supra note 24, at 655.  Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
there was a clear boundary between acts of a state and those of private citizens in commerce 
because “states tended to stay away from private acts of trade and commerce.” SIMBEYE, supra 
note 30, at 97.  As states became increasingly involved in trade over time, this line became 
blurred as “acts that belonged to the private sphere . . . were now being attributed to the state.” 
Id.  As a result, a state’s “[a]bsolute immunity became . . . increasingly inappropriate” as it 
placed governmental organizations in an “extremely unfair position” over private citizens. Id.  
During the twentieth century, “to ensure that commercial governmental agencies and private 
citizens were placed on an equal footing,” states applied the restrictive state-immunity doctrine 
to determine which state acts were entitled to immunity. Id.  Under the restrictive state-
immunity doctrine, a state’s public acts (acts jure imperii) were entitled to immunity, while a 
state’s private acts (acts jure gestionis) were not. Id.  By the middle of the twentieth century, 
states in Western Europe, except the United Kingdom, applied the restrictive state-immunity 
doctrine in civil cases. See id. at 97–98 (describing the gradual adoption of the restrictive state-
immunity doctrine by Austria, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European 
Convention on State Immunity, and the International Law Commission). 
 43. SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 41, § 12.3 (“[I]mmunity ratione materiae 
is restricted to acts performed in the exercise of the functions of the office on behalf of the 
State.”). 
 44. SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 109. 
 45. See Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 78. 
 46. SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 109. 
 47. Id. at 110. 
 48. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 79. 
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post.”49  As a result, a state official can be held accountable for his or her 
private acts once he or she ceases to hold office.50  But during the official’s 
tenure, the official cannot be sued or prosecuted. 
Immunity ratione materiae, also known as functional immunity or 
qualified immunity in U.S. legal parlance,51 protects state officials with 
respect to acts “performed in fulfilment of functions of the State.”52  Such 
immunity is necessary so that states cannot exercise jurisdiction over foreign 
officials to impede the performance of government functions.53  This sort of 
qualified immunity attaches in domestic and foreign courts. 
Qualified immunity ratione materiae, in theory, flows from the concept of 
state immunity because “only acts that ‘human beings in their capacity as 
organs of the State’ perform manifest the legal existence of a State.”54  
Therefore, to qualify as an act covered by qualified immunity ratione 
materiae, the act must be “official.”55 
Under modern customary international law, there are two tests for 
determining whether a state official’s act is “official”:  the “presumed 
apparent authority” test and the “personal motive” test.56  The “presumed 
apparent authority” test relies on the apparent authority a state has given to 
its official;57 the “personal motive” test turns on the state official’s 
underlying motive for performing an act.58  Under the “personal motive” test, 
“acts ‘performed exclusively to satisfy a personal interest’ prevent” a state 
official from claiming immunity ratione materiae.59 
The International Law Commission (the “Commission”), a United Nations 
organ created to advise on the development of international law, recognizes 
that the concepts of immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione 
materiae are useful in demonstrating the immunity of state officials.60  This 
Note uses these terms to discuss immunity as it extends to members of a head 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 126. 
 51. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 52. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 80; see also Chok, supra note 35, at 497 (explaining 
that immunity ratione materiae “applies when the impugned acts are conducted under the 
authority of a sovereign, independent of whether the individuals are in office”). 
 53. See Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 95 (“The functional . . . rationale for the immunity 
of State officials is . . . a direct rationale.  One State, in exercising its criminal jurisdiction over 
officials of another State, may not hamper the performance by those officials of their 
government functions, interfere with activities related to the performance of those functions, 
or create obstacles to the activities of persons representing the other State in its international 
relations . . . .”). 
 54. Chok, supra note 35, at 498 (quoting HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 358 (2d ed. 1966)). 
 55. Id. at 499. 
 56. Id. at 499–500. 
 57. Id. (“The mandate and directions that a State gives to its officials determine the official 
nature of an official’s act.”). 
 58. Id. at 500. 
 59. Id. (quoting Institut de Droit International [IDI], Immunities from Jurisdiction and 
Execution of Heads of State and of Government in International Law art. 13, para. 2 (Aug. 26, 
2001), http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/2001_van_02_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EZ2C-KFYX]). 
 60. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 83. 
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of state’s family, although the argument herein proposes qualified immunity 
ratione materiae as the doctrinal rubric for such family members. 
B.  The Absolute Immunity of a Head of State 
Head-of-state61 immunity is derived from state immunity62 or sovereign 
immunity.63  Because a head of state had been generally considered a 
personification of the state,64 “many countries felt no practical need to 
distinguish between head-of-state immunity and state sovereign 
immunity.”65  So, like a state, a head of state had absolute immunity for “acts 
committed either in a public or a private capacity.”66  However, state 
immunity and head-of-state immunity began to diverge into separate legal 
doctrines as the international community adopted the restrictive state-
immunity doctrine.67  As state immunity went from being absolute to 
restricted, it became unclear whether head-of-state immunity would follow 
the same trend or, more specifically, what the extent of head-of-state 
immunity would be.68 
Because head-of-state immunity inheres in a person, it involves a 
complication:  a head of state may act in his or her official capacity or in his 
or her private capacity.69  Heads of state act in their official capacity when 
they “act in line with their state’s position in a given subject matter, or act 
within th[eir] state’s given boundaries for action.”70  Such official acts are 
entitled to immunity under any theory.71 
 
 61. Heads of state include reigning sovereigns, such as in the United Kingdom, or heads 
of government, such as in the United States. SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 94 n.17. 
 62. Compare Shobha Varughese George, Head-of-State Immunity in the United States 
Courts:  Still Confused After All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1995) (stating 
that “sovereign immunity for states and heads-of-state immunity were considered one and the 
same because the head-of-state was considered to be the equivalent of the state”), with 
SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 93 n.15 (arguing that state immunity and head-of-state immunity 
are not the same and that head-of-state immunity is better understood as “a by-product of state 
immunity” because a head of state “can only be accorded immunity emanating from his state’s 
immunity”), and Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity:  
The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 171 (1986) (explaining that both head-
of-state immunity and sovereign immunity originate from a common source but have “evolved 
into separate legal constructs”). 
 63. SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 93 (“State immunity grew from this personal immunity of 
the sovereign.”). 
 64. Gilbert Sison, A King No More:  The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine 
of Head of State Immunity, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1583, 1584 (2000); see also SIMBEYE, supra 
note 30, at 94. 
 65. Tunks, supra note 24, at 655. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. (“[A]s the international community moved toward a restrictive form of sovereign 
immunity, stripping away a state’s immunity for private or commercial acts, it became unclear 
whether the doctrine of head-of-state immunity would follow that course as well, or whether 
international law would preserve a greater degree of personal inviolability for world leaders.”). 
 69. See SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 126–27. 
 70. Id. at 128. 
 71. See supra Part I.A. 
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Due to competing policy concerns, there is a divergence of opinion in 
customary international law72 with respect to head-of-state immunity for 
private acts.73  On the one hand are policies concerning the interests of 
justice—for instance, holding a head of state accountable for violations of 
international human rights in his or her own country.74  On the other hand are 
policies concerning sovereign equality and the functional necessity of head-
of-state immunity.75  One view is that a head of state traveling in his or her 
private capacity is “not then acting as [a] representative of a sovereign state” 
and is therefore “not entitled to any exemptions from the authority and 
jurisdiction of the local state.”76  Another view is that a head of state “is at 
all times in some degree representing [the] state,” so a head of state should 
always be entitled to the same privileges and immunities that he or she is 
entitled to when appearing in an official capacity to avoid interference in 
fulfilling the head-of-state function.77 
The international community continues to address the scope of head-of-
state immunity.  At its fifty-eighth session in 2006, the Commission 
embarked on a mission to add clarity to the extent of head-of-state 
immunity.78  A preliminary report prepared by Special Rapporteur Roman 
Anatolevich Kolodkin and subsequent reports addressing the topic of 
 
 72. “Customary international law” is a principle that is “widely accepted by the 
international community and generally regarded as giving rise to legal obligations.” Mallory, 
supra note 62, at 176–77. 
 73. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 454 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts 
eds., 9th ed. 1992).  The Commission embraces the notion that heads of state are entitled to 
absolute immunity under absolute immunity ratione personae, which essentially encompasses 
qualified immunity ratione materiae. See Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 82; Mallory, supra 
note 62, at 177 (“While a survey of the international community’s approach to head of state 
immunity reveals wide agreement that heads of state are entitled to some immunity, there is 
no consensus on the extent of that immunity.”); Tunks, supra note 24, at 655 (“[N]ations began 
thinking about head-of-state immunity as a distinct legal concept, and recognized the need to 
reconsider the extent to which the goals of sovereign equality and functional necessity together 
could justify exempting heads of state from judicial process abroad.”); see also Mallory, supra 
note 62, at 177–78 (describing the varying methods states have employed in determining when 
to grant head-of-state immunity, which further illustrates the lack of agreement among states 
as to the degree of head-of-state immunity that should be granted). 
 74. Tunks, supra note 24, at 656 (explaining that the end of the twentieth century saw an 
increasing effort by the international community to protect against human rights violations, 
which motivated states to “whittle away at the shield of immunity historically enjoyed by 
heads of state”).  See generally R. v. Bartle, Ex parte Pinochet [1999] 38 ILM 581 (HL) (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (holding that Chile’s ex-dictator, General Augusto Pinochet, was not entitled 
to head-of-state immunity for his acts that violated the 1984 Convention on Torture); Beth 
Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669 
(2011) (discussing cases that have considered violations of international human rights norms 
in denying foreign officials immunity). 
 75. See Tunks, supra note 24, at 655–56. 
 76. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73, § 454. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, at 445, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) (explaining that 
it would be better for the Commission to limit its discussion of the scope of immunity granted 
to state officials to heads of state and government and ministers for foreign affairs); id. at 442–
43 (explaining that the Commission’s discussion of the scope of immunity granted to state 
officials should only cover a state official’s immunity from domestic and criminal 
jurisdiction). 
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“Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction” have 
consistently recognized that heads of state enjoy absolute immunity ratione 
personae.79  The Commission’s most recent reports, however, evidence its 
consideration of imposing limitations or exceptions to a head of state’s 
absolute immunity ratione personae as it is applied in foreign criminal 
jurisdiction.80  Thus, formulating the degree of immunity awarded to heads 
of state is still a work in progress.81 
In the preliminary report prepared by Kolodkin, the Commission 
considered whether the scope of head-of-state immunity extends to the family 
members of a head of state, but Kolodkin asserted that this subject was 
outside the Commission’s mandate.82  In its limited discussion of the 
immunity granted to family members of a head of state, the Commission 
noted that, in both doctrine and practice, the source of granting immunity to 
family members of a senior official, such as a head of state, is not 
international law but international comity.83  Furthermore, such immunity 
could only be absolute immunity ratione personae in nature.84  The 
Commission also found that one common basis upon which immunity had 
been extended to head-of-state family members in the past was that the family 
members were part of a head of state’s immediate family.85  Since 
mentioning it in the preliminary report, no subsequent report by the 
Commission on the topic of “Immunity of State Officials from Foreign 
 
 79. See Concepción Escobar Hernández (Special Rapporteur), Fifth Report on Immunity 
of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 19(f), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/701 
(June 14, 2016) [hereinafter Hernández, Fifth Report]; Concepción Escobar Hernández 
(Special Rapporteur), Fourth Report on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction, para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/686 (May 29, 2015); Concepción Escobar 
Hernández (Special Rapporteur), Third Report on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 112, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/673 (June 2, 2014); Concepción Escobar 
Hernández (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on the Immunity of State Officials from 
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/661 (Apr. 4, 2013); Concepción 
Escobar Hernández (Special Rapporteur), Preliminary Report on the Immunity of State 
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/654 (May 31, 
2012); Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur), Third Report on Immunity of State 
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/646 (May 24, 
2011); Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on Immunity of 
State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/631 (June 10, 
2010); Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 78.  Kolodkin’s preliminary report includes heads of 
state in its definition of state officials in its discussion of immunity for state officials from the 
criminal jurisdiction of foreign states. Id. para. 106. 
 80. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, at 163–64, U.N. Doc. A/72/10 (2017) (“The 
Commission had before it the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur analysing the question of 
limitations and exceptions to the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction 
(A/CN.4/701), which it had begun to debate at its sixty-eighth session.”); Hernández, Fifth 
Report, supra note 79, para. 235 (“The goal is to determine whether or not Heads of State, 
Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, during their term of office, are 
affected by the limitations or exceptions to immunity analysed above.”). 
 81. The Commission is currently soliciting information from states regarding how they 
approach immunity. Sixty-Ninth Session (2017), INT’L LAW COMM’N (Mar. 2, 2018), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/69/ [https://perma.cc/F8RK-DQNM]. 
 82. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 129. 
 83. See id. paras. 36, 128. 
 84. See id. para. 125. 
 85. See id. paras. 127–28. 
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Criminal Jurisdiction” has further explored the subject of immunity granted 
to family members of a head of state. 
C.  Functional Immunity as It Applies to a Diplomatic Agent 
The concept of immunity of state representatives dates back to ancient 
times.86  The “bearers of messages from one leader to another were 
sacrosanct” and “[t]his idea eventually grew to the practice we now know as 
diplomatic inviolability and immunity.”87  Such privileges and immunities 
enable diplomats “to act independently of any local pressures in negotiation, 
to listen and speak on behalf of a foreign State while being themselves under 
protection from attack or harassment,” and were accordingly “essential to the 
conduct of relations between independent sovereign States.”88 
It was not until the Congress of Vienna adopted the Regulation of March 
19, 1815, however, that the international community began to codify 
diplomatic law, including immunity from litigation or prosecution.89  
Attempts at systematic codifications of the rules of diplomatic law continued 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century but were unavailing.90  
Finally, in 1961, the current international law on diplomatic immunity and 
other privileges was codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations of 1961 (VCDR).91 
Justification for the continuing tradition of diplomatic immunity is 
grounded in three interrelated theories based on the history noted above:  
(1) the concept of diplomats as foreign sovereign representatives; (2) the 
notion of foreign sovereign persons as property, which meant that diplomats 
and embassies were extraterritorial; and (3) the functional necessity of 
 
 86. See Wright, supra note 38, at 195–96 (“Diplomatic immunity is a doctrine dating as 
far back as ancient India, Rome and the Greek city-state system.  Islamic law from as early as 
Mohammed also accorded diplomats immunity.”); Eileen Denza, Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L., http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/vcdr/ 
vcdr.html [https://perma.cc/CQ4G-YYFZ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 87. See SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 94; see also id. at 94–95 nn.19–21. 
 88. SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 41, § 8.4. 
 89. Documents of the Eighth Session Including the Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 133, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1. 
 90. See generally SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 41, § 8.5 (explaining that 
the 1928 Havana Convention on Diplomatic Officers and the 1932 Harvard Research Draft 
Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities were the two most important attempts 
at establishing uniform rules of diplomatic law, but neither one of these efforts drew majority 
support from the international community). 
 91. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.  The 
VCDR is currently ratified by 191 countries. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src= 
treaty&mtdsg_no=iii-3&chapter=3&lang=en [https://perma.cc/LV6R-2PWD] (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2018).  The privileges and immunities under the VCDR do not extend to consuls, 
which are instead covered by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963. See 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.  Throughout 
history, consuls have been viewed as “distinct in function and legal status from diplomatic 
agents.” Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 830, 884 (2006).  The principle job of a consul is not diplomatic but commercial. Id. at 
884–85 nn.273–74. 
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guaranteeing protection to ensure reciprocity and sovereign-to-sovereign 
dialogue.92  The functional necessity theory has emerged as the prevailing 
modern basis for diplomatic immunity.93  Hence, this Note focuses on the 
theory of functional necessity in its discussion.94  The functional necessity 
theory “assumes that the absence of diplomatic immunity would lead to a 
breakdown in the conduct of foreign relations.”95  If diplomats were to be 
“liable to ordinary legal and political interference like other individuals, . . . 
they might be influenced by personal considerations of safety and comfort to 
a degree [that] would materially hamper them in the exercise of their 
functions.”96  Therefore, the acts that a diplomat commits “as the arm or as 
mouthpiece of the home state” are subject to immunity.97 
When the Commission drafted the VCDR, it expressly stated in draft 
commentary its intent to apply the theory of functional necessity.98  The 
preamble to the VCDR also reflects this intent.99  Furthermore, article 39(2) 
of the VCDR sets forth the concept of immunity ratione materiae to those 
acts that are closely related to the fulfillment of diplomatic functions.100  As 
a result, acts that diplomatic personnel commit and are not connected with 
his or her official diplomatic functions are not entitled to immunity.101 
The VCDR concerns diplomatic personnel and their families.102  A 
diplomat is someone who is appointed by a national government to 
“promot[e] friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving 
 
 92. Nina Maja Bergmar, Note, Demanding Accountability Where Accountability Is Due:  
A Functional Necessity Approach to Diplomatic Immunity Under the Vienna Convention, 47 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 507 (2014).  The theory of representative of the sovereign grants 
an individual diplomat the same privileges and immunities as that of the sending state. Id. 
(explaining that the “theory of representative of the sovereign, also known as personal 
representation, holds that ‘the representative’s privileges are similar to those of the sovereign 
herself, and an insult to the ambassador is an insult to the dignity of the sovereign’” (quoting 
Leslie Shirin Farhangi, Note, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 1517, 1520–21 (1986))).  The theory of extraterritoriality holds that the civil and criminal 
jurisdictions of the receiving state can never reach a diplomat because a diplomat cannot be 
deemed to have ever left the sending state. Wright, supra note 38, at 197. 
 93. See SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 41, § 8.3 (“Modern practice and 
theory have adopted this explanation of ‘functional need’ as the correct explanation of and 
justification for diplomatic privileges and immunities.”). 
 94. For a discussion of the representative of the sovereign and extraterritoriality theories, 
see Ross, supra note 39, at 177–78. 
 95. Wright, supra note 38, at 201. 
 96. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73, § 489. 
 97. See VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 36, at 106. 
 98. Documents of the Tenth Session Including the Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly, [1958] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 129, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.1. 
 99. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 96 (“Realizing that the 
purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the 
efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States . . . .”). 
 100. See id. at 118 (“[W]ith respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of 
his functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist.”). 
 101. See id. 
 102. See Justin M. Papka, The Grace Mugabe Incident:  Defining Immunity and 
Inviolability of Spouses of Heads of State, BSIS J. INT’L STUD., 2009, at 1, 5. 
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State, and develop[] their economic, cultural and scientific relations.”103  The 
VCDR defines four different categories of diplomatic personnel and 
attributes varying degrees of diplomatic immunity to each category.104  These 
categories are diplomatic agents, administrative and technical staff, service 
staff, and private servants.  The focus of this Note is the first category.105 
A diplomatic agent is “the head of the mission or a member of the 
diplomatic staff of the mission.”106  Under the VCDR, diplomatic agents are 
granted absolute immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of a receiving 
state—that is, they cannot be prosecuted for any official or private acts.107  
However, diplomatic agents are subject to the civil jurisdiction of the 
receiving state in certain cases.108 
The family members of diplomatic agents are granted the same privileges 
and immunities as diplomatic agents.109  Although the drafters of the VCDR 
“abstained from determining criteria for members of the family,” they 
emphasized that a spouse and the minor children of a diplomatic agent 
constitute core family members who receive diplomatic immunity.110  The 
drafters of the VCDR recognized the necessity of extending diplomatic 
immunity to cover the acts of a diplomatic agent’s family members because 
 
 103. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 98 (noting that other 
functions of a diplomatic mission include “representing the sending State in the receiving 
State,” “protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, 
within the limits permitted by international law,” “negotiating with the Government of the 
receiving State,” and “ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the 
receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State”). 
 104. Ross, supra note 39, at 181. 
 105. The second category is the administrative and technical staff, which includes 
“members of the staff of the mission employed in the administrative and technical service of 
the mission.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 98.  Those who 
fall into this category of diplomatic personnel and their family members enjoy blanket 
immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. Id. at 116.  However, immunity 
from the civil jurisdiction of the receiving state is limited to the members of the administrative 
and technical staff, and their family members, in that they only have immunity when it comes 
to acts performed within the course of their duties. Id.  The third category covers service staff, 
which includes “members of the staff of the mission in the domestic service of the mission.” 
Id. at 98.  Members of the service staff “who are not nationals of or permanently resident in 
the receiving State” enjoy immunity only with respect to the acts they perform in the course 
of their duties. Id. at 116.  The fourth and final category is the private servant, who “is a 
person . . . in the domestic service of a member of the mission and who is not an employee of 
the sending State.” Id. at 98.  Private servants are only granted immunity “to the extent 
admitted by the receiving State.” Id. at 116.  The receiving state can only exercise its 
jurisdiction over a private servant to the extent that it does not “interfere unduly with the 
performance of the functions of the mission.” Id. 
 106. Id. at 98. 
 107. Id. at 112. 
 108. Id. (stating that a diplomatic agent is not entitled to immunity from a receiving state’s 
civil jurisdiction for (1) “a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the 
territory of the receiving State”; (2) “an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic 
agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on 
behalf of the sending State”; and (3) “an action relating to any professional or commercial 
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions”). 
 109. Id. at 116. 
 110. Mehmet Yavuz, Scope of Diplomatic Family in Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, 4 LAW & JUST. REV. 181, 192 (2013). 
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the functions of a diplomatic agent would otherwise be impeded by pressure 
if, for instance, his or her spouse or child was being criminally prosecuted by 
the host nation’s law enforcement authorities.111 
The VCDR accordingly grants absolute immunity from criminal 
prosecution by the receiving state to members of a diplomatic agent’s 
family.112  Otherwise, ambassadors would likely live in their stations alone 
and leave their families behind.113  It is worth noting that states do have a 
legitimate legal basis for extending diplomatic immunity to family members 
of a diplomatic agent. 
The above argument was made in an infamous case in the United States.  
On November 29, 1982, Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira Jr. shot Kenneth 
Skeen at the Godfather nightclub in Washington, D.C.114  Silveira Jr. was 
initially charged with shooting Skeen,115 but prosecution ceased because 
diplomatic immunity was granted to Silveira Jr., the son of Brazil’s then-
ambassador to the United States.116  This grant of diplomatic immunity was 
legally grounded in the Diplomatic Relations Act, the U.S. statute that 
implements the VCDR.117  The U.S. Department of State’s guidance states 
that the privileges and immunities under the VCDR are essential because 
“foreign representatives can carry out their duties effectively only if they are 
accorded a certain degree of insulation from the application of standard law 
enforcement practices of the host country.”118  The same view was applied 
when U.S. State Department official Richard Gookin expressed in a letter to 
 
 111. Summary Records of the Tenth Session, [1958] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 162, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958 (“Lastly, unless the members of a diplomatic agent’s family 
enjoyed immunity, pressure could be brought to bear on the diplomatic agent through his 
family.”). 
 112. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 112 (“A diplomatic 
agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.”). 
 113. Whether such blanket immunity is subject to abuse when it is granted to members of 
a diplomatic agent’s family is beyond the scope of this Note.  For a discussion on abuse of 
diplomatic immunity, see Eirwen-Jane Pierrot, Escaping Diplomatic Impunity:  The Case for 
Diplomatic Law Reform, B. COUNCIL (Oct. 2010), http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/ 
media/61895/eirwen-jane_pierrot__42_.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CBD-AFFM]. 
 114. Eric Pianin, Bounds of Diplomatic Immunity, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 1987), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1987/08/05/bounds-of-diplomatic-
immunity/5d050b31-cb14-43b4-b28e-eb5634e8faed [https://perma.cc/U67U-8D5M]. 
 115. Brazil and Ambassador’s Son Face Lawsuit over Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 
1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/12/12/us/brazil-and-ambassador-s-son-face-lawsuit-
over-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/9NGM-XJN2]. 
 116. Pianin, supra note 114. 
 117. Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 254a(4) (2012) (“[VCDR] entered into force 
with respect to the United States on December 13, 1972.”).  The United States enforces the 
provisions of the VCDR through its Diplomatic Relations Acts that it enacted in 1978.  See 
generally Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 22, 28 U.S.C.); Bergmar, supra note 92, at 504 (“The VCDR, 
which is a non self-executing treaty, gained legal force in the United States through the 
enactment of the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, in which Congress ‘established the Vienna 
Convention as the sole U.S. law governing diplomatic privileges and immunities.’” (quoting 
LINDA S. FREY & MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 490 (1999))). 
 118. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR 
IMMUNITY:  GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES 4 (2015), 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/150546.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK7T-RY2N]. 
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Skeen that “it is not fair to conclude that diplomatic immunity as a concept 
is not legitimate or that the laws concerning immunity need be changed.”119 
A state’s decision to extend immunity to a diplomatic agent is premised in 
large part on reciprocity—the expectation that its diplomatic agents will be 
treated in the same manner when they are in a foreign state.120  A diplomatic 
agent and members of his or her family who enter the territory of a foreign 
state subject themselves to the laws of that state.121  Hence, only that state, 
as a formal matter, holds the power to grant jurisdictional immunity, which 
protects a diplomatic agent and his family from “being subject to the power 
and authority of a [foreign state’s] court to hear and decide a judicial 
proceeding.”122  The sending state may waive diplomatic immunity pursuant 
to article 32 of the VCDR.123  This rarely happens.  And when the sending 
state refuses to do so, the receiving state could in theory declare “the head of 
the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission” persona 
non grata and order him or her out of the country.124  Nevertheless, states 
rarely declare a diplomatic agent or his or her family members personae non 
gratae because doing so could create tension between the receiving state and 
the sending state, which could possibly lead to reciprocal retaliation.125 
II.  HOW STATES HAVE GRANTED AND LIMITED IMMUNITY 
TO MEMBERS OF A HEAD OF STATE’S FAMILY 
The extent of head-of-state immunity under customary international law is 
unclear; the extent of immunity for members of a head of state’s family is 
necessarily also unsettled.  A host state may voluntarily declare a family 
member immune to avoid rocking the boat—not out of a sense of legal 
obligation but on the basis of international comity.126  When a family member 
 
 119. Pianin, supra note 114. 
 120. See SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 93 n.9 (“States accord each other’s representatives 
immunity on a reciprocal basis . . . .”); Mallory, supra note 62, at 169. 
 121. See Mallory, supra note 62, at 169. 
 122. See id. at 170 n.3. 
 123. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 112 (explaining that a 
waiver of diplomatic immunity by the sending state must always be express).  However, states 
are typically unwilling to waive diplomatic immunity, “even in cases where the cost of doing 
so would be minimal.” Bergmar, supra note 92, at 506. 
 124. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 102. 
 125. See Bergmar, supra note 92, at 506 (“Although a persona non grata procedure appears 
simple, it is rarely used in practice.  Fear of reciprocity and disrupted diplomatic relationships 
weigh in favor of simply absorbing the costs of misdeeds.”); see also, e.g., Ross, supra note 
39, at 188, 202–03 (“The main practical reason cited for continuing diplomatic immunity in 
the face of constant abuse of the privilege is the political reality of reciprocity.  Some 
commentators fear direct foreign governmental responses in the form of fabricated charges 
against United States foreign service officers abroad if the United States prosecuted foreign 
diplomats at home.”). 
 126. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 128 (“The view that, if the members of the family of a 
Head of State are also granted immunity, it is on the basis only of international comity and not 
of international law was supported in the resolution of the Institute of International Law.”).  
The Institute of International Law is a private organization composed of leading international 
lawyers who present resolutions to governmental authorities, international organizations, and 
the scientific community to facilitate the development of international law. About the Institute, 
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arrives in the receiving state as part of the head of state’s entourage during 
an official visit, or is acting in his or her own official capacity, extending the 
same privileges and immunities as are extended to a head of state seems more 
in line with a legal obligation.127  However, exempting members of a head of 
state’s family from “the authority and jurisdiction of the state which they are 
visiting” for private acts sounds more in the realm of a policy choice.128 
Nevertheless, even in such cases, many states have asserted that they are 
granting immunity from prosecution to members of a head of state’s family, 
and one could assert that the commonality of the practice has attained the 
status of customary international law.  This Part presents cases that 
demonstrate how states have addressed whether to grant immunity to a 
member of a head of state’s family in light of concerns of international comity 
and impeding the function of a head of state.  Part II.A discusses cases where 
states have limited immunity for members of a head of state’s family to 
official acts.  In contrast, Part II.B examines cases in which states have 
granted immunity to family members of a head of state for private acts. 
A.  To Grant, or Not to Grant, “How Official” Is the Question:  
Extending Immunity to Members of 
a Head of State’s Family for Official Acts 
As discussed above, head-of-state immunity is founded upon the 
fundamental concept of sovereign immunity that “the state and its ruler [are] 
one.”129  States hesitate to exercise their jurisdiction over the representatives 
of other states out of respect for sovereignty and a desire for reciprocal 
respect.130  This undergirds grants of immunity ratione materiae to members 
of a head of state’s family for acts committed in an official capacity. 
This principle was illustrated in a U.S. case involving Prince Charles of 
Great Britain, who, at the time as now, was the son and heir apparent of 
Queen Elizabeth II.131  A U.S. district court dismissed a civil complaint 
brought against Prince Charles for acts that he allegedly committed during a 
state visit to the United States.132  In October 1977, Prince Charles embarked 
on a thirteen-day trip to the United States and was scheduled to visit ten cities, 
including Cleveland, Ohio.133  In Ohio, Prince Charles was “to address a 
special convocation called to dedicate the building housing Cleveland State 
 
INSTITUT DE DROIT INT’L, http://www.idi-iil.org/en/a-propos/ [https://perma.cc/4STG-MU2Q] 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 127. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73, § 453. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Mallory, supra note 62, at 170. 
 130. See Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 96 n.184; see also supra Part I.B. 
 131. Janice Williams, Will Queen Elizabeth Give Prince Charles the Throne in 2018?, 
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 28, 2017, 12:05 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/queen-elizabeth-prince-
charles-retirement-762110 [https://perma.cc/3DNS-VHGL]. 
 132. See Kilroy v. Windsor, No. C 78-291, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20419, at *1 (N.D. Ohio 
Dec. 7, 1978). 
 133. Roy Reed, Charles, A Dashing Prince, Is Likely to Charm U.S. on Visit, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 15, 1977), http://www.nytimes.com/1977/10/15/archives/charles-a-dashing-prince-is-
likely-to-charm-us-on-visit.html [https://perma.cc/7T3M-BW75]. 
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University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.”134  Just as Prince Charles 
was preparing to address his audience, third-year law student Jack Kilroy, 
stood up and asked the Prince, “I would like to know when England is going 
to stop torturing political prisoners?”135  Kilroy was subsequently escorted 
out by security guards.136 
In 1978, a year later, Kilroy filed a civil complaint against Prince Charles 
for alleged deprivation of “various rights guaranteed by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States.”137  In response to Kilroy’s complaint, the U.S. 
Attorney General, upon the recommendation of the State Department, filed a 
suggestion of immunity with the court.138  The State Department made the 
suggestion, despite the fact that Prince Charles was a member of Queen 
Elizabeth II’s family and not yet Great Britain’s head of state, on the view 
that the acts he allegedly committed were performed in his official 
capacity.139  The district court agreed with the State Department and reasoned 
that immunity “applies with even more force to live persons representing a 
foreign nation on an official visit.”140  Declining to grant immunity in such a 
case would not only deter future visits by a head of state’s family members 
but would also “possibly offend[ the] nation.”141  The court relied heavily on 
the fact that Prince Charles was in Cleveland on official business, not for 
personal reasons. 
The Austrian Supreme Court of Justice applied similar logic when it 
refused to grant immunity to the siblings of the reigning Prince Hans-Adam 
II of Liechtenstein.  In 2001, an Austrian citizen identified as Anita W. 
brought suit against the Prince, his sister, and his two brothers seeking a 
declaratory judgment that would establish affiliation between her and the 
siblings’ father.142  The court held that Prince Hans-Adam II was entitled 
under customary international law to absolute immunity as the head of state 
with respect to both official and private functions.143  However, the court 
held that the Prince’s siblings were not entitled to the same immunity.144  The 
court reasoned that the Prince’s siblings “were not close members of the 
family of the Head of State forming part of his household” and were, 
 
 134. W. James Van Vliet et al., Irish Ire Cooled by Royal Reserve:  Student Asks Prince 
About Ulster Torture, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 21, 1977, at 8-A. 
 135. Id. 
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 137. Kilroy, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20419, at *1. 
 138. Id. at *2 (explaining that a determination of immunity “by the Executive Branch of 
our government, pursuant to its primacy over questions of foreign policy and the conduct of 
international affairs, is binding and not reviewable in this or any court”). 
 139. See id. at *3 (explaining that the U.S. Department of State reasoned that it granted 
Prince Charles immunity because his visit was a special diplomatic mission and he was 
therefore considered an official diplomatic envoy during his visit to the United States). 
 140. Id. at *2–3. 
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therefore, not “entitled to immunity under customary international law.”145  
In addition, the court recognized that the case before it concerned a private 
function that did not affect the Prince’s public and constitutional position.146  
As a result, the court’s refusal to grant immunity to the Prince’s siblings did 
not impede any official functions of the head of state, and respect for 
sovereignty remained intact. 
Likewise, the Civil Court of Brussels refused to extend immunity to the 
wife and children of the former President of Zaire.  In 1988, former President 
Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga asked the Brussels court to 
vacate an attachment on his family’s property in Belgium that was granted 
upon request by Cotoni, an agriculture company.147  Former President 
Mobutu argued that he and his family enjoyed head-of-state immunity from 
“both civil and criminal jurisdiction, whether or not the acts in question fall 
within the framework of the exercise of their official duties.”148  The court 
rejected then-President Mobutu’s argument and did not recognize immunity 
for the members of his family.149  The court reasoned that unlike the former 
President Mobutu, who would be entitled to head-of-state immunity under 
customary international law, his wife and children “could not rely on a rule 
of immunity from jurisdiction.”150  Furthermore, the court noted that head-
of-state immunity only covered official acts as the actual head of state.151  
Nevertheless, the court vacated the attachment on the separate, nonimmunity 
ground that former President Mobutu and his family could not be held 
personally liable to pay debt that “was clearly the responsibility of a company 
properly constituted under the law of Zaire.”152 
B.  First Ladies and Their Private Acts:  Extending Immunity 
to Members of a Head of State’s Family for Private Acts 
While there have been instances in which states limited immunity for 
members of a head of state’s family to acts committed in official functions,153 
there have also been cases where states have granted immunity to family 
 
 145. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 126. 
 146. See JOANNE FOAKES, THE POSITION OF HEADS OF STATE AND SENIOR OFFICIALS IN 
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de Liège, Mons et Bruxelles [JLMB] 1989, 169 (Belg.), reprinted in 91 I.L.R. 259, 259 (1993).  
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Belgian Court Seizes Mobutu Properties, UPI (Dec. 21, 1988), https://www.upi.com/ 
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 148. Mobutu, 91 I.L.R. at 260. 
 149. Id. at 260–61. 
 150. VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 36, at 184. 
 151. See Mobutu, 91 I.L.R. at 260 (explaining that head-of-state immunity “can only 
benefit [former President Mobutu] as the bearer of the title of Head of State”). 
 152. Id. at 259. 
 153. See supra Part II.A. 
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members for private acts.  Such grants of immunity have often been invoked 
when concerns about foreign relations outweighed concerns of whether the 
act was committed in an official function. 
In Kline v. Kaneko,154 a U.S. court extended immunity to a head of state’s 
family member despite acknowledging that the conduct at issue involved a 
private act.155  In 1988, Rukmini Sukarno Kline sued the first lady of Mexico, 
Paloma Cordero de De la Madrid, for causing her “false imprisonment and 
abduction . . . from her Mexico City apartment.”156  The case was filed in 
state court but was removed to federal court before it was remanded back to 
state court to determine whether the case would be dismissed against De la 
Madrid on grounds of immunity.157  The State Department filed a suggestion 
of immunity for De la Madrid upon request by the Mexican government.158  
The New York Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the case against 
Mexico’s then-first lady pursuant to the suggestion of immunity.159  The state 
court echoed the federal court’s finding that De la Madrid’s “alleged conduct 
was carried out exclusively in a private capacity.”160  Nevertheless, the court 
reasoned that it was the “court’s duty” to dismiss the case so as not to 
“interfere with the executive’s proper handling of foreign affairs.”161  Thus, 
the New York court strongly implied that the discretionary dismissal was a 
matter of international comity, not a legal obligation. 
The long and corrupt tenure of Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos and 
his infamously profligate wife Imelda spawned a welter of litigation in 
multiple jurisdictions that resulted in important immunity holdings.  Even 
after the two were ousted from their country by prodemocracy opposition,162 
they were dogged by accusations of having diverted large amounts of money 
belonging to the Philippine government.163  One instance involved the 
Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland’s recognition of immunity for both 
Marcos and his wife in response to U.S. requests for discovery assistance 
with respect to purloined assets suspected to be stashed in Swiss bank 
 
 154. 685 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 155. Id. at 388. 
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within the government.”). 
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616 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
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accounts.164  In pursuing a criminal matter against the former President and 
first lady, the U.S. Public Prosecutor for the State of New York, acting 
through the U.S. Department of Justice, requested mutual assistance from the 
Swiss Federal Office of Police.165  Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos objected to 
the grant of this request before the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland on 
the ground of head-of-state immunity.166  The Swiss court agreed and upheld 
immunity for both Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos despite their alleged and 
paradigmatically private acts—stealing government funds.167 
Consider again the case elaborated in the Introduction regarding the South 
African government’s invocation of immunity for the now-former first lady 
of Zimbabwe after she assaulted a model with an extension cord.168  Was the 
immunity granted diplomatic immunity?  The VCDR has force of law in 
South Africa under section 2(1) of South Africa’s Diplomatic Immunities and 
Privileges Act.169  The VCDR defines a diplomatic agent as “the head of the 
mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission.”170  A diplomatic 
agent enjoys blanket immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving 
state under article 31(1) of the VCDR.171  Article 37(1) of the VCDR extends 
this to “members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his 
household.”172 
Grace Mugabe was not in South Africa as the head of a mission or as a 
member of the diplomatic staff of a mission at the time of attack on Engels.173  
Her husband, former President Robert Mugabe, confirmed that the purpose 
of her visit to South Africa was for medical consultation over an injured 
leg.174  However, following her attack on Engels, Grace Mugabe claimed that 
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the purpose of her visit to South Africa was to attend the regional summit 
held by the Southern African Development Community,175 an event Grace 
Mugabe did not attend.176 
Furthermore, Grace Mugabe was not entitled to diplomatic immunity as 
former President Robert Mugabe’s spouse because he was in South Africa as 
the head of state of Zimbabwe, not as a diplomatic agent.  The summit hosted 
by the Southern African Development Community is an annual gathering of 
regional heads of state and of government.177  A document published by the 
Southern African Development Community on its website after the summit 
lists then-President Robert Mugabe as one of the attendees among other 
heads of state who were in attendance.178  Based on these facts, the protection 
extended to family members of a diplomatic agent under article 37(1) of the 
VCDR plainly does not extend to Grace Mugabe.179  The VCDR “does not 
deal with the personal privileges and immunities of the head of state.”180  In 
sum, the VCDR or diplomatic immunity generally does not extend to the 
facts of South Africa’s grant of diplomatic immunity to Grace Mugabe. 
III.  FOREIGN IMMUNITY FOR A HEAD OF STATE’S FAMILY MEMBERS 
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RATIONE MATERIAE 
The reason for extending absolute immunity to a head of state does not 
apply to his or her family members, and so they warrant only qualified 
immunity for official acts.  The head of state “is seen as personifying the 
sovereign State and the immunity to which he [or she] was entitled is 
predicated on status.”181  But this logic does not apply to family members; 
nor do the practical reciprocity policy reasons extend with equal force since 
diplomatic family members live for extended periods in the receiving 
country. 
As an intermediary position, this rationale could apply to the spouse of a 
head of state who accompanies the head of state on an official visit to a 
foreign country.  When the spouse and the head of state arrive together in a 
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foreign state on official business, the two are viewed as one unit representing 
the sovereign state.  Subjecting the spouse, who is fulfilling an official duty, 
to criminal or civil liability could interfere with the function of the head of 
state because the couple is recognized as a unit.  Moreover, there are instances 
in which the spouse could be carrying out an official function by furthering 
diplomacy on behalf of his or her country.182  Therefore, in instances where 
the spouse of a head of state is accompanying the head of state on an official 
visit and is fulfilling an official function, it would be appropriate to extend 
immunity to the spouse. 
But even when the act in question has been committed in a private capacity 
and not in the fulfillment of an official function, states have granted immunity 
to members of a head of state’s family, particularly to first ladies.183  As the 
New York court’s opinion suggests,184 however, this is done as a matter of 
discretionary international comity, not law.185  The bottom-line rationale is 
reciprocity—a favor to the other state with hopes that such favor will be 
returned in the future.186  When host governments such as South Africa 
characterize grants as legally compelled, they risk diluting the general logic 
for the immunities and disables justice for victims who are often host-nation 
citizens.  Specifically, granting absolute immunity to a first lady suggests that 
she has a function that is equivalent to that of a head of state, which is not 
true.  A head of state is entitled to absolute immunity ratione personae 
because he or she is considered the personification of the sovereign state.187  
Diplomatic agents were historically granted absolute immunity ratione 
personae under the theory that they represented the sovereign state, but such 
absolute immunity has been reduced to qualified immunity ratione 
materiae.188  This restriction makes sense in light of the fact that diplomatic 
agents, unlike heads of state, are not embodiments of the sovereign state itself 
but act only as an arm or mouthpiece of the state.189  The function of a first 
lady is closer to that of a diplomatic agent than that of a head of state because 
her position does not symbolize the state itself.  Therefore, it is more 
appropriate for a first lady to be entitled to qualified immunity ratione 
materiae for official conduct, not for private acts. 
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Moreover, limiting a first lady’s immunity to qualified immunity ratione 
materiae does not necessarily impede the functions of her official position.  
When Grace Mugabe attacked Engels, she was not acting in an official 
capacity as a diplomatic agent on a diplomatic mission.190  She was acting in 
her private capacity as a mother on a personal mission to reprimand her two 
sons for their bad behavior.191  The former first lady’s pursuit of her private 
mission made Engels a victim of the first lady’s private conduct.192  If Grace 
Mugabe were to have been subject to South Africa’s criminal jurisdiction as 
a result of her behavior, this would not have necessarily impeded her official 
duties as first lady.  Although Grace Mugabe later changed her story to make 
it appear as if she were in South Africa to carry out her official duties as first 
lady,193 her own husband had already confirmed that she was in South Africa 
for medical treatment.194  Even if the altered story were true, subjecting 
Grace Mugabe to South Africa’s criminal jurisdiction would not have 
changed the outcome of her so-called “official visit” because she failed to 
attend the regional summit even after diplomatic immunity was granted.195  
As exemplified in the incident between Grace Mugabe and Engels, allowing 
immunity of first ladies for acts committed in their private capacity and not 
in the furtherance of an official duty only encourages abuse of power.196 
Refusing immunity for the private acts of a first lady is also unlikely to 
interfere with the official functions of a head of state in a way that the law 
should countenance.  One commentator, Justin Papka, poses a hypothetical 
outcome to the incident of Grace Mugabe beating a photographer for 
snapping a photo of her during a shopping spree in Hong Kong.197  If Hong 
Kong were to prosecute Grace Mugabe for assault, her husband might have 
been distracted from his official duties as President of Zimbabwe.  From a 
logical standpoint, this could have disrupted Zimbabwe’s internal affairs, and 
it also might have damaged Zimbabwe’s relations with China.198  Papka 
concludes that the chance of these consequences is remote.199  But even if 
they were likely, the answer is that it should be up to China to let Grace 
Mugabe leave and escape prosecution as a policy choice and a matter of 
sovereign grace, not legal obligation. 
As a general matter, there has been a movement away from absolute 
immunity and toward qualified immunity in both civil and criminal contexts, 
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with a focus on balancing respect for sovereignty with interests of justice and 
individual rights.200  State immunity, for instance, has evolved from absolute 
to none whatsoever with respect to commercial activities carried on by 
sovereign entities in foreign jurisdictions.201 
Furthermore, in recent years, some in the international community have 
argued for abolishing head-of-state blanket immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction in other countries for grave international human rights law 
violations,202 such as the 1984 Convention on Torture.203  If the country itself 
has ratified the treaty, then it cannot possibly be justified as a sovereign act 
and so the act could only have been committed in the individual’s private 
capacity.204 
The immunity of a member of a head of state’s family should be similarly 
restricted.  While there are instances in which family members of a head of 
state serve as embodiments of the sovereign official, and must therefore be 
granted immunity,205 that determination should be made after considering the 
potential injustice that may result from a grant of immunity.  Upholding 
respect for the sovereignty of a state may become the less attractive option 
depending on the seriousness of the act and the capacity in which the act was 
committed.206  A state’s grant of immunity to a member of a head of state’s 
family for a private act that has no connection with the fulfillment of an 
official function should be clearly identified and justified as a policy decision, 
not a legal obligation.207 
CONCLUSION 
Heads of state, particularly in the developing world, are often fabulously 
wealthy and lead lives of which their people can only dream.  It has become 
common for the family members of heads of state—including wives, 
children, and grandchildren—to travel to foreign countries to obtain an 
education, shop, travel, eat, and play in sparkling cities that often stand in 
stark contrast to their homes.  When these family members commit crimes or 
act in ways that cause injury, the legal presumption should be that they are 
liable or prosecutable.  True, a lawsuit may seem to be a sham, a grudge, or 
even a shakedown.  If so, the host government is at liberty to dismiss the suit 
or allow the implicated family member to leave the country for the sake of 
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harmonious relations.  But to act or even imply that immunity in such 
instances is an obligation of customary international law, whether as a part 
of diplomatic or head-of-state immunity, is not only inaccurate—it risks 
undermining respect for those bona fide immunities and the reasons for 
which they exist.  When the South African public saw Grace Mugabe get off 
scot-free because of “diplomatic immunity,” many likely perceived 
diplomatic immunity as a joke or a gross inequity.  And what of the victim?  
Does the state not have a duty to protect the interests of its people, as well as 
a duty to ensure peaceful international relations?  The language of law 
deployed as justification here is dangerous and should be curtailed.  The 
proper balance is to recognize that the family members of heads of state have 
immunity when traveling to foreign countries on official business for their 
official acts but not for their private acts.  Just as the international community 
has come to accept nonimmunity for the commercial activities of foreign 
sovereigns, it should acknowledge nonimmunity for the private activities of 
family members of foreign heads of state. 
 
